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Abstract  
 
 
 
 
Despite its achievements the exact status of the EU’s international role remains 
highly contested in the academic debate. For some analysts, the EU can be legiti-
mately considered as a global actor in both economic and security terms, but for 
others the notion of an EU foreign policy still seems distant. Hence, there are 
good reasons for this thesis to focus on the European Union and its role on the 
global arena. The central research problem that this thesis sets out to explore is the 
international role of the EU as an agent of foreign policy action during the first 
years of the 21
st
 century. Following on K.J. Holsti’s work on role theory in for-
eign policy analysis this problem is analysed by examining how the EU look upon 
itself, its role, as an international actor.  
 Primarily this thesis intend to answer two questions: Which foreign policy roles 
does the EU ascribe to itself? and How has the distribution of roles evolved since 
the beginning of the 21
st
 century?  
 The analysis, and the conclusions drawn from it, is based on the reading of offi-
cial foreign and security policy speeches, and to a certain extent statements, deliv-
ered by the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP), Javier Solana. The analysis presented a role-set consisting of ten roles in 
total: Stabilizer, Promoter of Multilateralism, Partner, Regional Leader, De-
fender/Promoter of Peace and Security, Defender/Promoter of “EU” Values, De-
veloper, Model, Global Leader, and Liberation Supporter. When looking at the 
different roles sorted by year one easily notices the strong evolution of EU’s per-
ceived role as a Stabilizer. Other obvious trends are the decreasing emphasis put 
on the role as Developer and Liberation Supporter, and the high emphasis on 
promotion of multilateralism and partnership.  
 It is argued here that the changes in role conceptions and the emphasis put on 
each role could be explained by studying changes in capability. The launch of the 
ESDP in 2003 is considered to be crucial.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
”Ladies and gentlemen, there was a time when the EU’s foreign policy was criti-
cised for being all talk and no action. And some people still feel today that we put 
too much emphasis on producing papers or creating structures in Brussels. I dis-
agree because probably the biggest change in the past two years is that the EU 
is taking on important operational tasks: in the Balkans, the Southern Caucasus, 
Africa and elsewhere. As the Security Strategy suggested: Europe needs to be 
more active and capable – and that is exactly what we have become.” 
      
Javier Solana speaking at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation  
24 January 2005 [www] p.6 
 
The ambitious concept of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was 
proclaimed in the Maastricht treaty of the early 1990s. More recently, 12 Decem-
ber 2003, a European Security Strategy was formulated that makes explicit refer-
ence to the notion of Europe as a force for good. The European Union (EU) mem-
ber states have also agreed to a European Rapid Reaction Force comprising of 
60 000 troops. The EU is now involved in an unprecedented way in peace-keeping 
operations in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Macedonia. In these missions, the EU demonstrates its unique capacity 
to combine a comprehensive set of civilian means (such as aid, economic incen-
tives and civilian police forces) with military power for crisis management and 
conflict prevention. The process of European integration sure continues to pro-
duce ever more astonishing results. 
 Despite these achievements, and despite Javier Solana’s conviction, the exact 
status of the EU’s international role remains highly contested in the academic de-
bate, and the question about a European foreign policy is still in the early 21
st
 cen-
tury a controversial issue on the political agenda. For some analysts, the EU can 
be legitimately considered as a global actor in both economic and security terms 
(Bretherton et al, 1999 p.78 f. and 221 f.). For others the notion of an EU foreign 
policy still seems distant (see Aggestam, 2004 p.9 and Hill et al, 2002 p.13). ‘One 
conclusion to be drawn form this analytical heterogeneity is that the EU remains 
largely an unidentified international object with a rather mercurial existence and 
impact’ (Elgström et al, 2005 p.1 f.). So there are good reasons for this thesis to 
focus on the European Union and its role on the global arena. 
 In a recent study, examining the role conceptions and the politics of identity in 
Great Britain, France and Germany in the 1990s, Lisbeth Aggestam (PhD at 
Stockholm University) concluded that ‘a common European role, giving sub-
stance to the CFSP, emerged not before the very end of the 1990s’ (Aggestam, 
2004 p.249). My intention here is to find that role.  
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1.1  Statement of Purpose  
 
The central research problem that this thesis sets out to explore is the international 
role of the EU as an agent of foreign policy action during the first years of the 21
st
 
century. This problem is analysed by examining how the EU look upon itself as 
an international actor. The analytical focus, in other words, is directed towards the 
subjective dimension of foreign policy and the self-understanding of the policy 
maker. It is argued here that by focusing on the self-understanding we can get a 
glimpse of the EU’s definition of its own role, its meaning of action, and conse-
quently what the EU intends to be in the world.   
 
“the most important initial step to take, when inquiring into the meaning of an ac-
tion, is to determine what meaning this given act has for the actor whose behav-
iour we wish to clarify and explain.” 
 
Carlsneas quoted in Aggestam, 2004 p.3 
 
The concept of role, and the role an actor is perceived to be playing in the interna-
tional system, is also often seen as a crucial component of an actor’s international 
identity (Aggestam, 2004 p.3 f.).  
 This thesis intends to fulfil its purpose by answering two questions: 
 
Which foreign policy roles does the EU ascribe to itself? 
 
How has the distribution of roles evolved since the beginning  
of the 21
st
 century? 
 
 
1.2  Material   
 
The empirical material consists principally of primary sources. Secondary sour-
ces, such as academic studies and books have only been used as background read-
ing and as a guide through empirical material. The analysis, and the conclusions 
drawn from it, is based on the reading of official foreign and security policy 
speeches, and to a certain extent statements, delivered by the Secretary-General of 
the Council of the EU and High Representative for EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) – Javier Solana – the years 2000-2005. To choose Solana 
as the main source for defining authoritative conceptions of role was natural. 
Javier Solana is the highest ranking civil servant within the framework of the 
CFSP, and shall according to the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) assist the 
Council in matters coming within the scope of the common foreign and security 
policy, in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and im-
plementation of policy decisions, and, when appropriate and acting on behalf of 
the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political dialogue 
with third parties. 
 In the initial face of the research process the aim was to include, as the empirical 
basis of this study, a minimum of ten speeches pertaining to each year. In order to 
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minimize potential biases the criteria for selection were that a speech should as a 
rule have the format of a key foreign policy speech, i.e. be of a general and strate-
gic nature were Solana set out the broad outlines of EU foreign and security pol-
icy. The sources of these speeches were found on the Internet, and first and fore-
most the official homepage of the Secretary-General of the Council. However, 
because of the limited supply of general speeches held by Solana and posted on 
the eu.int domain, especially for the time period 1
st
 January 2002 – 31
st
 December 
2002, some shorter and more issue specific speeches, and as a last resort state-
ments, were included to fill up the minimum quota of each year. For the same 
reason also other Internet domains were consulted such as the European Foreign 
Policy Bulletin, provided by the European University Institute in Florence, and 
NATO. The empirical material representing year 2005 consists of seven 
speeches/statements only, the last speech held in Warsaw 11 May 2005. This of 
course constitutes a problem that has to be considered when reflecting upon the 
empirical analysis. In total eighty speeches and statements are included.  
 The secondary sources providing the theoretical framework and to a large extent 
the methodology employed is essentially made up by Stephen G. Walker’s (ed.) 
Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis including a chapter by K.J. Holsti which 
is an abridged version of National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Pol-
icy, in turn published in International Studies Quarterly 14 (1970): 233-309. Two 
other publications that deserve to be mentioned here is Aggestam’s thesis A Euro-
pean Foreign Policy? – Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Britain, 
France and Germany and Philip G. Le Prestre’s (ed.) Role Quests in the Post-
Cold War Era. Aggestam’s thesis has been the primary source of inspiration when 
conducting this study.  
 
 
1.3  Delimitations  
 
Foreign policy is multi-dimensional in the sense that it embraces a number of dif-
ferent policies. Far from simply concerning the high politics of national (or some 
other entities) security, foreign policy may be conceived as embracing the total 
sum of the individual actor’s external relations. The internationalisation of politics 
has significantly broadened the scope for what we may consider foreign policy. It 
is therefore important to be precise about the issue area that is the object of the 
analytical focus.  
 The EU is often pictured as a ‘foreign policy system’, composed of the three 
pillars as well as the member states’ foreign policies (Smith, 2003 p.2). The em-
phasis here, though, lies with the EU, not at the national, level. The CSFP pillar 
most obviously concerns foreign policy, but foreign policy at the EU level is not 
only a product of the CFSP. The European Community (EC) has the competence 
to conduct external economic relations, and thus contains important foreign policy 
instruments employed by the Commission.  
 However, this study is traditional in the sense that foreign policy is primarily 
analysed in terms of political, diplomatic and security relations. Consequently the 
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focus rests entirely on the CFSP. There is at least one reason for this restrictive 
notion of foreign policy. It has been important to keep the empirical work within 
manageable proportions. A more inclusive definition or application of EU foreign 
policy would run the risk of loosing analytical clarity, as well as making the study 
extremely work-intensive. As a consequence the EU’s (or more properly the 
EC’s) repertoire of roles in the world political economy, based on its position as a 
trade policy actor, will be included only to the extent they are conceived by Javier 
Solana as a part of the EU role-set within the CFSP.  
 
 
1.4  Disposition  
 
The thesis consists of five chapters. This introductory chapter is followed by a 
discussion about the EU’s status as an international actor in chapter two. The aim 
is to give an insight into the debate concerning EU actorness and the notion of an 
EU foreign policy. The discussion will depart from two claims that are fundamen-
tal to this project; 1) the EU is to be considered as an international actor and 2) the 
EU has a foreign policy of its own.  
 Chapter three provides a presentation of the theoretical framework employed in 
this study. The chapter is structured in two parts where the first one address the 
relevance of role theory when conducting foreign policy analysis. The second part 
introduces the role concept and how it’s applied here in order to fulfil the purpose. 
 Chapter four has two parts, the first one being the methodological discussion 
which naturally aims to present and discuss the method employed. The second 
part constitutes the heart of this thesis, which is the empirical analysis.  
 The final chapter, chapter five, intends to properly present the answers to the 
two research questions.     
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2.  A European Foreign  
      Policy?  
 
 
 
 
 
The European Union has evolved considerably from its 1950s origin as a common 
market with six member states. Today the EU is the world’s largest unified market 
and trading bloc, conducting economic and political relations with virtually every 
country on earth. Already in the 1970s Johan Galtung portrayed the EC/EU as ‘a 
superpower in the making´ and while, in 1973, Galtung’s arguments were rather 
controversial, the discussion of the EU as a global power with global responsibili-
ties is no longer remarkable (Galtung, 1973). ‘To say that the EU has considerable 
presence in international affairs is no longer a radical statement’ (Smith, 2003 
p.24). Even so there has been during the past twenty years an almost continuous 
debate about the nature of the EU as an international actor. At one end of the spec-
trum are those who see the EU as a potential state, or at least the performer of 
essential state functions in the international political arena (Elgström et al, 2005 
p.1). At the other end are those who see the EU as at best a ‘patchy and frag-
mented international participant, and a little more than a system of regular diplo-
matic coordination between the member states’ (Elgström et al, 2005 p.1).  
 This thesis sets out to explore how the EU perceives of itself as an actor in in-
ternational politics, through its foreign policy role conceptions. Consequently, this 
thesis basically rest on two claims: 1) the EU is to be considered as an interna-
tional actor and 2) the EU has a foreign policy of its own. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the ambiguity surrounding these two claims.    
 
 
2.1  EU Actorness   
 
 
“Indeed we are a global actor. With 25 member states, with over 450 million in-
habitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 40% of the world merchan-
dise exports; and with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, 
diplomatic, military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a state-
ment of fact.”  
 
Javier Solana speaking at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation  
24 January 2005 [www] p.2 
 
Through its economic strength the EU has gained a lot of influence in almost all 
corners of the world, and the union has for many years been a respected actor in 
the global economy (McCormick, 2002 p.194). Despite Solana’s conviction how-
ever, the situation is somewhat different when it comes to foreign and security 
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policy. Security and foreign policy issues have mainly been a domain reserved for 
the individual member states. It is so not least because of the traditional view on 
security and actorness being closely linked to the notion of the sovereign state and 
its military capabilities. Is it then totally wrong to label the EU as an international 
actor?    
 The primary issue here is how we define actorness. Which are the characteristics 
of the units that constitute the international system? A formal answer to the ques-
tion “How do we recognize an actor?” is provided by public international law. 
This, by definition, focuses upon the interstate system, and has developed its own 
formal concept of actorness in terms of the notion of legal personality. Legal ac-
torness confers a right to participate, but also to be held responsible by other ac-
tors, and to incur obligations. In conventional International Relations the answer 
to the question ‘How do we recognize an actor?’ is essentially the same as that 
given by the lawyers: states. Thus international law and International Relations 
define actorness through looking at the properties of the sovereign state (Brether-
ton et al, 1999 p.16 ff.). This is in many ways a narrow and simplistic view which 
basically excludes both international organisations and multinational coopera-
tion’s, and deny them any kind of real political influence, including the EU.  
 As has been mentioned before judgements concerning EU actorness abound, 
although systematic analyses of the bases of actorness are relatively uncommon 
(Bretherton et al, 1999 p.36). In many cases, viewed externally, the EU is simply 
assumed to be an important actor. This implies, of course, that the EU possesses 
the characteristics and capability of an important international actor. All the same 
there are scholars who have, through their research, come to the same conclusion.    
 In the mid seventies Gunnar Sjöstedt argued that the European Community was 
to be regarded as an international actor. Already then the community possessed 
those basic prerequisites that Sjöstedt believed was absolutely essential for an 
international actor, i.e. autonomy and capability (Sjöstedt, 1977 p.18). To be 
autonomous, according to Sjöstedt, a unit has to 1) be delimited from others and 
from its environment, and 2) have a minimal degree of internal cohesion (Sjöstedt, 
1977 p.15). The second actor criterion is, according to Sjöstedt, capability. The 
short definition of capability would be that an actor has to be able to act or pro-
duce actor behaviour (Sjöstedt, 1977 p.16). Through identifying a number of 
structural prerequisites for the production of actor behaviour Sjöstedt constructed 
a model to determine the EC actor capability at a certain point in time. To be la-
belled as an international actor a unit have to possess qualities that represent every 
one of these (ten) prerequisites (Sjöstedt, 1977 p.75).
1
  
 Capability is also central to Christopher Hill’s definition of actorness. Hill ar-
gues that ‘true actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained 
decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy’ (Hill et 
al, 2002 p.13). The results of Hills research shows that the EU falls some way 
short in at least some of these dimensions.    
                                                 
1
 1. Community of interest; 2. Goal articulation system; 3. Resource mobilisation system; 4. Re-
sources for action; 5. Interdependence management system; 6. Crisis management system; 7. 
Normal decision-making system; 8. Control and steering system; 9. Network of agents; 10. Net-
work of transaction channels.    
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“(...) actorness in the world is something which most non-theoretical observers 
automatically assume that the European Community possesses, but which on 
closer examination might be seriously doubted (…). The truth, (…), is that the 
Community is a genuine international actor in some respects but not all.”  
 
Hill 1993 p.308  
 
According to Hill the lack of military capabilities stand between the EU and real 
actorness. At the same time it is hard to deny the fact that the member states of the 
European Union have established ‘a collective presence in the international 
arena’, and it is impossible to ignore the effects of EU action in the international 
system (Hill et al, 2002 p.13). If the other actors in the system perceive of the EC 
as a real international actor it is hard to argue something else (Hill, 1993 p.318). 
Thus, Hills definition of actorness doesn’t totally exclude the EU. Certain short-
comings in capability don’t have to imply a total lack of ability. Hill concludes 
that the EC ‘could conceivably reach the position of being able to act purposefully 
and as one while eschewing a military capability’ (Hill, 1993 p.318). However, it 
has to be pointed out that Hill consider the EU’s lack of assured access to military 
instruments to be a significant impediment to its actor capability. ‘Defence is the 
key to the development of the union’s place in the world’ and even if the EU has 
reached a certain degree of actorness ‘they (the EU member states) depend on 
favourable conjunctions of external circumstances and operate largely in the 
longer term’ (Hill, 1993 p.318 and Hill et al, 2002 p.13).  
 Bretherton et al define actorness as the individual unit’s ability to independently 
formulate goals and engage in some form of purposive action to fulfil them (Bre-
therton et al, 1999 p.37 ff.).
2
 They argue that an attempt to view the EU through 
the conceptual lenses of statehood will result in an image that obscures the unions 
fundamental characteristics as an international actor (Bretherton et al, 1999 
p.258). Even if the EU has a lot to wish for in “traditional” capability the union 
possesses a number of unique qualities that have to be taken into account, not 
least the mere scope that EU policies cover. To a greater or lesser extent, all the 
significant issue areas of contemporary global politics can be addressed by the 
union as an actor, except for strictly military and strategic relations, but even here 
is “soft EU non-military security measures” of great use (Bretherton et al, 1999 
p.170 and 249).   
  
”(…) the EU may not be a superpower (a term that implies the possession of 
great military power as well as economic strength) but it is certainly a global 
power.”  
 
Bretherton et al 1999 p.36 
 
At least two of the three scholars referred to here have more or less granted the 
EU status of an international actor (Hill being somewhat hesitant). Accordingly I 
                                                 
2
 Bretherton et al propose five basic requirements for actorness: 1. a shared commitment to a set of 
overarching values and principles; 2. the ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate co-
herent policies; 3. The ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system; 
4. the availability of, and capacity to utilize policy instruments; and 5. domestic legitimation of 
decision processes, and priorities, relating to external policy (Bretherton et al, 1999 p.38). 
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consider claim number one to be valid, the EU is to be considered as an interna-
tional actor. The EU may not exercise influence to the extent that, say, the United 
States does, but the union is an increasingly important international actor that 
plays an influential role in world politics.  
 
“The question is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role.”   
 
Javier Solana speaking at the Conference of Ambassadors in Rome  
24 July 2002 [www] p.4 
 
The next section in this chapter address claim number two – the EU, as an interna-
tional actor, has a foreign policy of its own.  
 
 
2.2  EU Foreign Policy   
 
 
”Foreign policies consists of those actions which, expressed in the form of explic-
itly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental 
representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed to-
ward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-
governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial le-
gitimacy.”  
 
Carlsneas quoted in Aggestam, 2004 p.5 
 
In the quote above Carlsneas present his answer to the question “What is foreign 
policy?”. Carlsnaes’ definition emphasises sovereign communities, which reflects 
a traditional view of foreign policy as the pursuit of national interests and state 
security through formal, intergovernmental relations. Karen E. Smith presents a 
somewhat similar definition when stating that: 
 
“Foreign policy (…) means the activity of developing and managing relationships 
between the state (or, in our case, the EU) and other international actors, which 
promotes the domestic values and interests of the state or actor in question. For-
eign policy can entail the use of economic instruments, but its aims are explicitly 
political or security-related.”  
 
Smith, 2003 p.2  
 
Hence, foreign policy is roughly defined as the individual actor’s external behav-
iour (statements and other types of action), and the existence of foreign policy is 
consequently in the end connected to the notion of actorness. The three scholars 
referred to in the discussion regarding actorness above all stress the fact that ac-
torness is dependent on some kind of ability to act.
3
 Actorness is dependent on 
performance instruments or, to be more specific, in order to be an international 
actor the autonomous unit has to be able to produce foreign policy. Since I already 
                                                 
3
 Sjöstedt ten structural prerequisites for actorness include a system for resource mobilisation i.e. a 
system for the transformation of resources into behaviour. Hill demands practical capabilities to 
effect policy and Bretherton et al the availability of, and capacity to utilize policy instruments. 
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in the previous section determined that the EU should be considered to be an in-
ternational actor I automatically also ascribe the union a foreign policy. This is of 
course is not an uncontroversial claim.  
 Aggestam argues that the foreign policy competencies pooled on a European 
level mean that the whole concept of foreign policy has become problematic; in-
deed what is European foreign policy? (Aggestam, 2004 p.9). Even if the EU over 
the years has complied an arsenal of competencies and capabilities in foreign pol-
icy providing it with an actor presence and ‘international identity’ it is, according 
to Aggestam, important to stress that ‘we are not talking of national foreign policy 
writ large. European foreign policy is more appropriately analysed as a non-
unitary or disaggregated entity in world politics’ (Aggestam, 2004 p.9). This is so 
because the EU members are not necessarily seeking to formulate a single foreign 
policy, but seeking to combine national foreign policies into a common policy on 
those issues of joint interest.  
 
”(…) foreign policy making in western Europe is still the foreign policy of 15 na-
tion-states rather than the foreign policy of one supranational state.”  
 
Soetendorp quoted in Aggestam, 2004 p.9 
 
Historically the most obvious joint interest connecting the member states has been 
of an economic nature. The construction of the common market has made the EU 
an important economic actor and there is no doubt about the presence of a foreign 
economic policy where the objectives and means are strictly economic. Foreign 
policy however is ‘explicitly political or security related’ which is a relatively 
weak domain of the EU’s international presence (Aggestam, 2004 p.9).  
 Elgström join the debate by stating that it is the distinctiveness of the EU for-
eign policy that is the crucial point. While some scholars underline fundamental 
dissimilarities between EU and nation-states in employing foreign policy, ’a large 
number of observers tend to emphasise the uniqueness of the EU as an actor in 
international politics’ (Elgström et al, 2005 p.13). Elgström disregard the absence 
of certain policy instruments and lack of influence over certain policy issues and 
instead argue that the EU is a unique actor ‘owing to its peculiar configuration of 
policy instruments’ (Elgström et al, 2005 p.15). The EU use persuasion and posi-
tive incentives (rather than coercion) and constructive engagement (rather than 
isolation), and of course the use of economic instruments remain central in EU 
foreign policy (Elgström et al, 2005 p.15 and Smith, 2003 p.21 f.).  
 My opinion is that even in foreign and security policy ‘the European Union is 
much more than the sum of its member states’ (Solana, 17 March 2004 [www] 
p.2). Just because the EU lacks certain competencies, or tools for that matter, and 
to a large extent is dependent on the political will of its consisting parts; one can-
not deny the fact that today there are very few areas of foreign policy where the 
EU, as an actor, refrains from making a statement of some sort. The common for-
eign and security policy may not be the only expression of European foreign pol-
icy but nonetheless an important part of it. I therefore consider claim two to be 
valid, the EU, as an actor, is able to produce external behaviour and consequently 
has a foreign policy of its own.  
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3.  Theoretical Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
In an article published in 1970, Holsti called attention to the utility of a sociologi-
cal understanding of role as an actor’s characteristic pattern of behaviour. Holsti 
argued that he had found a way to conceptualise and operationalise the relation-
ship between identity and foreign policy behaviour when conducting empirical 
analysis. Based on an extensive cross-national study, he set out to investigate de-
cision-makers perceptions of their own nation, thereby focusing on the subjective 
dimension of foreign policy.  
 
“A national role conception includes the policymakers own definitions of the gen-
eral kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, 
and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the 
international system or in subordinate regional systems.”  
 
Holsti, 1987 p.12 
 
This chapter will present an outline of the theoretical framework used in this the-
sis. The first part addresses the relevance of role theory when making foreign pol-
icy analyses. The second part discusses different approaches of role theory and 
how it will be defined and used here. 
 
 
3.1  The Relevance of Role Theory to 
    Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
 
“(…) because the notion of national role suggest general orientations and con-
tinuing types of commitments, actions and functions, it has a level of generality 
appropriate for both foreign policy theories or frameworks, and systems studies.”  
 
“(…) a very powerful tool for explaining variations in many types of foreign policy 
behaviour.”  
 
Jönsson, 1984 p.17 
 
Historians, officials, and theorists of international relations often characterize for-
eign policy behaviour by terms which suggest patterned or recurring decisions and 
actions by governments. Typical classifications would include ‘non-aligned’, 
‘bloc leaders’, ‘balancers’ and ‘satellites’. When one classify a state as non-
aligned, it implies that in a variety of international contexts and situations; its dip-
lomatic actions and decisions will be consistent with the ‘rules’ subsumed under 
the general category of states called “non-aligned” (Holsti, 1987 p.5). Thus, the 
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term summarizes a broad but typical range of diplomatic behaviour and attitudes. 
Theorists of international politics have made references to national roles as possi-
ble causal variables in the operation of international systems, or in explaining the 
foreign policies of individual nations.  
 Le Prestre argues that the concept of ‘role’ and its potential contribution to for-
eign policy analysis has been largely neglected. While the concept has been 
widely used in sociology and anthropology, its application in political science has 
largely focused on attempts to understand the domestic behaviour of individuals 
(Le Prestre, 1997 p.5). This general ‘neglect’ can, according to Le Prestre, be at-
tributed to several factors, such as the popularity of other approaches – political 
economy, psychological theories, bureaucratic policies etc (Le Prestre, 1997 p.5). 
   However, defining a ‘role’ and having it accepted by others is still a basic objec-
tive of states. A role reflects a claim on the international system, a recognition by 
international actors, and a conception of national identity (Le Prestre, 1997 p.5). It 
can be regarded as the active behavioural dimension of a state’s international 
identity in foreign policy. The analytical originality basically builds upon the fact 
that ideas about who ‘we’ are tend to serve as a guide to ‘our’ understanding of 
basic values and ‘our’ choice of action in a given situation. Role articulation, ex-
pressing rights and obligations, can thus help explain the general direction of for-
eign policy choices.  
 
“The articulation of a role betrays preferences, operationalises an image of the 
world, triggers expectations, and influences the definition of the situation and of 
the available options. It imposes obligations and affects the definition of risks. Fo-
cusing on this concept, therefore allows one to go beyond the traditional explana-
tion of foreign policy, which is based on security or on the national interest de-
fined as the prudent search for power. Roles help define national interests and 
divorce them from power.”    
 
Le Prestre, 1997 p.5 
 
Le Prestre’s argumentation is in line with Holsti’s conclusions. Holsti’s research, 
using an inductive approach to explore what role conceptions policy makers 
themselves perceive and define, indicate that the practitioners of foreign policy 
express different and numerous roles for themselves than the general ones stipu-
lated deductively by academics (Holsti, 1987 p.28). Significantly, this seems to 
suggest that roles have multiple sources and are not exclusively generated by the 
distribution of power. This means that Holsti’s and Le Prestre’s findings are in 
contradiction to the role concept that has traditionally been used in IR-theory 
where the sources or roles are predominantly systemic and based on material fac-
tors. A role has mainly been deductively conceived of in the singular, as a general 
role, denoting ‘role expectations’ within a system of balance of power (Walker, 
1987 p.71). Thus, ‘contrary to the thesis of structural realism, capabilities alone do 
not define a role’ (Aggestam, 2004 p.12).     
 Even if Le Prestre is displeased with the amount of emphasis on, or general ne-
glect of, role theory as a tool in foreign policy analysis Holsti’s ground-breaking 
work has been followed by a series of scholarly work, by for instance Christer 
Jönsson (Superpower 1984) and Stephen G. Walker (Role Theory and Foreign 
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Policy Analysis 1987). In the 1990s, it generated renewed interest as part of the 
revival of sociological approaches to international relations theory and social the-
ory in political science (Aggestam, 2004 p.13). Here one finds Le Prestre’s own 
work from 1997 focusing on Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era.  
 Nonetheless, even if Walker argue that the potential utility of role analysis for 
understanding foreign policy is threefold: ‘it has descriptive, organisational, and 
explanatory value’, it is important to point out that there does not exist a general 
role theory per se, which provides coherent answers as to why, when and how 
certain role phenomena occur (Aggestam et al, 2000 p.49 f. and Walker, 1987 
p.2). Role theory is really more a research orientation or a framework rather than a 
powerful theory. The role concept can both theoretically and methodologically be 
applied to different perspectives based on the questions one set out to answer.  
 The purpose of the next section is therefore to discuss different interpretations 
of the role concept and present the role theoretic angle used in this study. 
 
 
3.2  Role Theory   
 
The word role has evolved from the theatre, where roles were originally the parts 
from which theatrical characters were read (Aggestam, 2004 p.63). The actor op-
erates with a script and is motivated to follow the script to comply with the rules 
of the game. Putting the theatrical analogy aside ‘role’ is a concept that initially 
was developed in sociology and social psychology to denote an actor’s character-
istic patterns of behaviour given a certain position. ‘Role [also] represents a link 
between individual personality and social structure, since the individual actor as 
role-player performs on the stage of the broader society’ (Aggestam, 2004 p.56). 
Individual roles are the result of individual qualities developing in a particular 
environmental setting and in interaction with other individuals.  
 Holsti argues that the term role, or role performance, refers to behaviour (deci-
sions and actions) and can be kept analytically distinct from role prescrip-
tions/expectation, which in turn are the norms and expectation attached to particu-
lar positions. The foundations of human behaviour are both the position and the 
norms and expectations the ‘alter’ projects on the position (Holsti, 1987 p.7). Role 
theory thus emphasises the interaction between the role prescription of the ‘alter’ 
and the role performance of the occupant of a position, the ‘ego’. While some 
aspects of behaviour are best examined on the personal level, attention could also 
successfully be shifted to the ego’s own conception of his/her position and func-
tions, and the behaviour appropriate to them, role conception (Holsti, 1987 p.7). 
The concept of role can thus be used in different ways.  
 
Role prescription/expectation refers to roles that other actors (alter) prescribe and 
expect the role beholder (ego) to enact. These expectations emanate from the basic 
cultural, institutional or judicial setting (Holsti, 1987 p.8).  
 
Role conception refers to the normative expectations that the role-beholder ex-
presses towards itself, i.e. the ego’s own definition. A role conception defines 
 18 
responsibilities and obligations in foreign policy. According to Holsti a role con-
ception is a product of a nation’s socialisation process and influenced by its his-
tory, culture and societal characteristics (Holsti, 1987 p.7). A role conception em-
bodies a mixture of norms, intentions and descriptions of reality.  
 It is important to note that not only do actors conceive different roles at different 
times but also of several roles at the same time. Holsti, for instance, identifies 
seventeen different role conceptions in his cross-national survey (presented 1970), 
and finds that no state conceives of only a single national role.
4
 This is what one 
call an actor’s role-set. The different roles within the role-set vary in importance 
and according to the situation at hand. Studies employing role theory have also 
shown that the fact that actors typically engage in multiple role-taking may create 
role strains in situations when two different roles in the role-set are contradictious 
(Jönsson, 1984 p.17).  
 
Role performance or the actual behaviour in terms of attitudes, decisions and ac-
tions undertaken in specific situational contexts, refers to how, in what ways, a 
role is played. Holsti suggest that behaviour is characterised by role performance, 
which in turn can be explained by the role conceptions held by decision-makers 
and the role prescriptions/expectations from the alter (Holsti, 1987 p.7 f.).    
 
 
 
 
 
fig.1 Holsti, 1987 p.8 
 
                                                 
4
 In Holsti’s sample the average number of different role conceptions per country was 4,6. The 
highest number of different role conceptions found was 8 (United Arab Republic and USA) and 
the lowest 0 (Ivory Coast) (Holsti, 1987 p.31). In a more recent study by Le Prestre the US role-set 
consisted of 11 different roles (Le Prestre, 1997 p.69). 
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As displayed in fig.1 role conceptions and role prescriptions/expectations forms a 
position from were role performance or behaviour is generated.
5
  
 Role indicators, when conducting role analysis, could obviously be either ac-
tions (role performance) or cognitions (role conceptions + prescriptions). Among 
psychologically oriented role analysts there has been a marked tendency to rely on 
role performance indicators, and studies employing the concept of role, primarily 
explain behaviour (role performance) by examining the relationship between the 
position and the sources of role prescriptions/expectations (Holsti, 1987 p.9 and 
Jönsson, 1984 p.17). To some extent scholars within the field of political science 
differ in this respect finding it preferable to focus on perceptions of the alter and 
the ego. In role-theoretic foreign policy analysis, in particular, there is a general 
emphasises on the self-conceptions of policymakers (see Jönsson 1984; Walker 
1987; Le Prestre 1997; Aggestam 2004).  
 
  
3.2.1  The Role Concept and  
    Foreign Policy Analysis    
 
The three analytical distinctions of roles, outlined above, are of course closely 
interlinked and sometimes hard to detach. Nonetheless, given the aim of this study 
the empirical focus resides predominantly with the notion of role conception. 
Thus, this is not an objective analysis of which roles that could be ascribed to the 
EU given its position as an actor in the international system. Instead this thesis 
sets out to investigate the subjective dimension of EU’s foreign policy.  
 Holsti suggests that the best way to understand the roles of foreign policy-
makers is to try to see them as they do. ‘The great strength of this approach is that 
it tries to careful account of political reality as it is experienced by the policy-
makers who construct it in a dynamic interaction between rules and reasons’ (Ag-
gestam, 2004 p.66). Holsti also describes national role conceptions as being more 
influential than the role prescriptions emanating from the external environment in 
shaping foreign policy behaviour (fig.2), or as Jönsson puts it ‘the norms or role 
prescriptions emanating from the external environment are weak’ (Walker, 1987 
p.242 and Jönsson, 1984 p.18). It is argued to be so mainly because of the fact that 
foreign policy behaviour in the end is based on national interest. ‘When incom-
patibility exists between highly valued national interest and the norms of behav-
iour established through treaties and the like, the latter normally give way to the 
former’ (Holsti, 1987 p.10). This claim has led some academics to draw parallels 
between state-centric realism and foreign policy role analysis. Lisbeth Aggestam 
however call these conclusions misleading and argues that a sociological theoris-
ing on role does not build upon realistic assumptions, but contends that prevailing 
beliefs and assumptions within a national society predisposes foreign policy-
makers towards certain ranges of foreign policy (Aggestam, 2004 p.7 f.). ‘Focus-
                                                 
5
 The concept of position is a behavioural setting with more or less well-defined functions, duties, 
rights, and privileges. Roles are often associated with certain positions i.e. banker, military chief,  
great power roles, presidency roles etc. (Holsti, 1987 p.9 and Elgström et al, 2005 p.10).  
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ing on role conceptions allows one to go beyond the traditional explanation of 
foreign policy as the prudent search for power’ (Aggestam, 2004 p.8). I would 
like to argue that role conceptions can help us understand the obligations and 
commitments that states and other types of actors perceive for themselves beyond 
mere considerations to maximise their own interest.   
 Regardless of the arguments that leads us towards a general focus on the ego’s 
role conceptions it is a clear that such an approach undermines the role theoretic 
concept of position as the base for action (when applying role theory to foreign 
policy analysis), thus making the ego’s own conception the main determinant of 
role performance (fig.2). Instead the nation-state position or status is suggested to 
be contextually determined, i.e. dependent on the issue and multinational setting 
at hand (Holsti, 1987 p.10 f.).
6
 
 
 
 
 
fig.2 Holsti, 1987 p.11 
 
 
In a more recent study however, more emphasis is put on the alters influence in 
determining role performance. Elgström argues that actors ‘cannot independently 
decide what roles to play, as roles also are influenced by the expectations of other 
actors (…). Actors behave in the way they believe is expected from them in a par-
ticular situation or context’ (Elgström et al, 2005 p.9).  
 Either way it is important to note here that national role conceptions, and role 
theory in general, do not provide us with information about specific details in for-
eign and security policy; they rather touch on the subject in a broader sense.  
                                                 
6
 The term status replaces the position and denotes only a rough estimate of a state’s ranking in the 
international system (Fig.2), which may or may not have appreciable consequences on the ways 
that policymakers define what they believe to be the appropriate international orientations or tasks 
for their nation (Holsti, 1987 p.11). 
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“role theory addresses itself to continuities and patterns rather than to small sam-
ples of behaviour or events (…) those who have applied role concepts to the in-
ternational context have been interested in long term patterns of foreign policy 
rather than direct actions or events .”    
 
Jönsson, 1984 p.17 
 
Role conceptions point at intentions and betray preferences, even if the final result 
in form of role performance can be, and often is, different and diluted.  
 In this thesis the role concept is viewed as a cognitive construct evolving in cor-
respondence with the conception of self in foreign policy, and providing a subjec-
tive meaning of the world from the individual actor’s ability to place “himself” 
into its context.  
  
The next chapter represents the heart of this thesis – the empirical analysis. The 
first section present and discuss the methodology employed, in other words, the 
way from theory to empirical analysis.   
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4. Role Conceptions of  
   EU Foreign Policy 
 
 
 
 
 
At this point it’s hardly any secret that the main objective of this thesis is to ex-
plore how the European Union perceives of itself as an actor in international poli-
tics, through a general focus on the Union’s foreign policy role conceptions. Fol-
lowing on Holsti’s work on role theory in foreign policy analysis, the empirical 
study of roles is conducted inductively in terms of how policy makers themselves 
(in this case Javier Solana) perceive and define roles. The purpose is to reveal 
conceptions of commitments, responsibilities and duties, hence the EU’s per-
ceived meaning of external action.  
 To achieve this I started of in chapter one by formulating two overarching re-
search questions: Which foreign policy roles does the EU ascribe to itself?, and  
How has the distribution of roles evolved since the beginning of the 21
st
 century? 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide answers to these two questions.  
 
 
4.1  From Theory to Empirical Analysis   
 
A common research strategy in previous role studies has been to measure the fre-
quency of different role statements by combining contents analysis with quantita-
tive techniques (Holsti, 1970, Jönsson, 1984, Thumerelle, 1997 etc.). In this re-
gard this study is not different. Is it then possible to combine a qualitative ap-
proach with quantitative techniques? 
 Traditionally in political science, quantitative and qualitative methods have been 
used by different researchers, to study different things and to answer different 
questions. However, is there really a clear distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative methods? Even the most obvious distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative data, that quantitative analysis involves large data sets which are usu-
ally analysed using statistical packages, while qualitative analysis involves a small 
number of cases analysed more in depth, is questionable. Not all quantitative data 
sets are large and not all qualitative data sets are small. Neither is it true that sta-
tistical analysis is only preformed on what are normally understood as quantitative 
data (Read et al, 2002 p.235). Read argues that ‘evidence from research practice 
suggest that the traditional philosophical division between quantitative and quali-
tative methods is increasingly becoming viewed as a false dichotomy’ (Read et al, 
2002 p.235). The question, whether it is possible to combine a qualitative ap-
proach with quantitative techniques, Read basically answers by stating that there 
is no reason not to. 
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“(…) there is no reason why interview data cannot be analysed using quantitative 
techniques (…). Similarly, we might undertake a content analysis of various offi-
cial documents or politicians’ speeches to establish how often globalisation is 
mentioned and whether, in these documents/speeches, there is a dominant dis-
course that presents globalisation as a constraint and argues that the nature of 
this constraint means that the government has no alternative but to pursue neo-
liberal economic policies.”     
 
Read et al, 2002 p.235 
 
  
4.1.1  Content Analysis    
 
‘Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively and sys-
tematically identifying specified characteristics of messages’ (Holsti quoted in Le 
Prestre, 1997 p.12).
7
 The emphasis is on imaginative procedures and new angles 
with which to probe a text, but also on ‘objectivity and comprehensiveness’ (Le 
Prestre, 1997 p.12). Content analysis relies on a series of judgements about the 
nature of the data, the choice of techniques, the categories used for coding, the 
coding itself, and the interpretation of the results. Le Prestre argues that because 
of these trades this approach comes with a magnified risk for bias and the dangers 
of wishful thinking, thus ‘putting a premium on the questions that are asked and 
on the rigour of the analysis’ (Le Prestre, 1997 p.12).  
 In the following analysis, roles will be identified by coding all the assertions 
that refer to the conceptions that Javier Solana hold of the commitments, duties 
and responsibilities of the EU in the international system. With the limitations 
stressed by Le Prestre in mind, the analysis, and the conclusions drawn from it, is 
based on the reading of official foreign and security policy speeches, and to a cer-
tain extent statements, delivered by Javier Solana the years 2000-05. The number 
of speeches pertaining to each year varies depending on availability.  
 Since only one coder was involved there is no problem of inter-coder reliability, 
but another critique to the approach employed here is that a general focus on offi-
cial speeches offers no insight into the speaker’s own mental representations of 
the problem he or she faces, or of the norms that govern his or her reflection and 
action. It is argued to be so mainly because in general speeches are not written by 
the speaker, and their function is primarily instrumental (Aggestam et al, 2000 
p.53 and Le Prestre, 1997 p.13). These observations however, although very much 
accurate, do not cripple the method. One counter argument is that in the age of 
instant communication no speaker can control the audience. A speech at a small 
official dinner in Niger could easily become front-page news in Europe. Speeches, 
and especially the general policy speeches preferred in this study, can only to a 
certain extent be tailored for a specific audience. Another argument is of course 
that the speech writer doesn’t put words in the speakers’ mouth. They rather pro-
vide an expertise in articulation.  
 
                                                 
7
 An alternative definition of content analysis – ’the classification and counting of data drawn from 
the text of media or political debates’ (John, 2002 p.218) 
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“Speeches seek to generate support, persuade citizens, and reinforce their be-
liefs, but they can also guide government’s action.”    
 
“What statesmen and diplomats say is often as vital as what they do. It would not 
be far-fetched to go further and declare that speech is an incisive form of action.”  
 
Abba Eban quoted in Le Prestre, 1997 p.14 
 
This project started inductively with a survey of twelve randomly selected 
speeches (two speeches from each year). The initial study sought to take note of 
all role statements articulated by Javier Solana with reference to duties and re-
sponsibilities that indicated expectancy of a particular form of foreign policy be-
haviour on the part of the EU. Methodological inspiration was especially obtained 
from Jean-François Thibault and his study on role conceptions in The Soviet Un-
ion and Russia. By first isolating sentences by their use of the following words: 
“we”, “us”, “our”, “European Union”, “EU” (and other EU abbreviations), and 
“Europe” it was easier, at least initially, to identify the conceptions of role (see 
Thibault et al, 1997 p.18). The different role conceptions identified builds mainly 
on typologies found in earlier studies employing the role concept, which have 
been redesigned to capture the unique perceptions of the EU (i.e. Holsti, 1970, 
Jönsson, 1984, Le Prestre, 1997, Beylerian, 1997 and Aggestam, 2004).  
 The initial study provided a sample of eight role conceptions as well as clues to 
the way themes might appear in other sources.
8
 This typology, or the EU role-set, 
was then refined and added to as the research process progressed and ended up 
containing ten different roles in total, the additional two derived from the readings 
of the rest of the empirical material.
9
 These results basically fulfils the purpose of 
the first part of this thesis, which is, to provide an answer to the question – Which 
foreign policy roles does the EU ascribe to itself?  
 Again with the limitations presented above in mind, the purpose of the second 
interpretation of the data is to identify trends. I would like to stress here that 
speculations about the meaning of frequencies for a specific year or category are 
speculations and nothing else. The primary aim is to determine how the distribu-
tion of roles has evolved since the beginning of year 2000 up until today.   
 
 
4.2  EU’s Role in the World as  
   Perceived by Javier Solana    
 
The eighty sources for this study provided evidence of ten different role concep-
tions. This section provides a presentation of the individual roles and describes the 
type of commitments, duties and responsibilities to which Javier Solana referred 
in each case. The order in which they are presented is randomly selected.  
 
                                                 
8
 Model; Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security; Regional Leader; Stabilizer; Developer; De-
fender/Promoter of “EU” values; Promoter of Multilateralism; and Partner. 
9
 Global Leader; and Liberation Supporter. 
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Model. This role conception emphasises the importance of promoting “the Euro-
pean experience” of reconciliation and integration only by setting a good example.  
Model is placed at low position on the passivity-activity dimension because it 
does not require any formal outward directed diplomatic program or special ef-
forts to be made.  
 
“The reconciliation achieved through the establishment of the Union is a powerful 
example of what regional integration can achieve. (…) Enlargement will serve to 
increase the role of Europe as a force for peace in the world by the example it 
sets.” Solana, 25 January 2000  
 
“The EU offers a model for regional integration as a guarantee for peace. It is a 
powerful and effective symbol of reconciliation.” Solana, 23 June 2000 
 
“(…) we have ended wars and oppression by transforming the European conti-
nent into a zone of unprecedented prosperity, security and freedom. (…) Others 
around the world are paying close attention. The African Union, Mercosur, Asean 
– these are all examples of strengthening regional regimes. They are explicitly 
taking their inspiration from the EU experience.” Solana, 24 January 2005  
 
Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security. This role corresponds to a universalist 
policy and refers to commitments, duties and responsibilities related to a general 
promotion of international peace and security. It also includes EU’s perceived 
responsibility regarding the issue of sustainable development, which, according to 
Javier Solana, to a large extent is dependent on participatory democracy and free-
market economic policies.   
 
“The EU has to use its potential to create a safer and more prosperous world. 
This is not just a moral obligation; it is also the only path towards real security 
and stability within the EU’s own borders.” Solana, 27 July 2004  
 
“In the last twenty years the Union has done a fantastic job of spreading prosper-
ity, democracy and stability on our continent. But the main challenge for the com-
ing twenty years will be how to best to spread prosperity, democracy and stability 
beyond our borders.” Solana, 19 November 2004 
 
Global Leader. Similar to the previous role Global Leader refers to commitments, 
duties and responsibilities related to the promotion of international peace, security 
and prosperity. However, here the emphasis is on the initiative. The Global 
Leader role expresses an intention or a responsibility to assume leadership, be the 
commander or main guardian, and not a follower, on a global scale.  
 Le Prestre found a somewhat similar role when applying Holsti’s framework on 
the United States and labelled it Hegemon (Le Prestre, 1997 p.69 f.). The differ-
ence between the Global Leader role of the EU and the Hegemon role of the US is 
that the latter is somewhat “stronger” in the sense that it expresses commitments 
closer to being a unilateral world policeman rather than just being the lead vehicle 
or catalyst in a group of many.      
 
“The end of the Cold War has meant that the EU is able more than ever to offer 
leadership in the area of security. (…) We are the only group of countries which 
together has the potential to match the United States in offering leadership.” So-
lana, 3 April 2001 
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“As a global actor the Union must now face up to its responsibility for global secu-
rity. (…) Lets be clear: Europe would be foolish to strive for a global role in rivalry 
with the United States. But this does not mean that the European Union should 
refrain from becoming a more credible actor on the world scene. This Union is al-
ready a global actor and must therefore not shrink from global responsibilities.” 
Solana, 2 October 2003 
 
“Our world is growing less safe and we do not have eternity before us. We have 
to act. Act rapidly. We have to give our response: Europe must play its role as a 
global actor. Yes, Europe today is the main vector of peace and democracy right 
across the world.” Solana, 18 April 2005 
 
Regional Leader. Again there are similarities to the two previous roles. The main 
difference between Global Leader role and Regional Leader role is of course the 
geographical area which it addresses. Regional Leader refers to duties and respon-
sibilities that the EU perceives for itself in its relation to states in the region. It 
basically relates to a whish of being a good neighbour through strong engagement 
and sound leadership. It also refers to EU’s commitment to embrace the region 
through further enlargement, and its responsibility for promoting intra-regional 
cooperation and a good milieu for development in general.    
 
 “Today we can say that the EU is more necessary than ever, and it is the main or 
perhaps the only stability and prosperity factor on our continent. It also consti-
tutes the only real prospect for peace and growth for the new democracies in 
Central and Eastern Europe.” Solana, 14 January 2000 
 
“Extending the zone of security around Europe: our task here is to create a ring of 
well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of 
the Mediterranean (…).” Solana, 18 June 2003 
 
“The European Union is powerfully attractive to many of our neighbours. But we 
must avoid a pattern of connections that point only to a single magnetic pole. All 
roads should not lead to Brussels. Our neighbours must deepen their own bilat-
eral and regional relationships. That is why, with both our Balkan and Mediterra-
nean neighbours, we must place such emphasis on intra-regional integration.” 
Solana, 19 November 2004 
 
Developer. The themes in this role conception indicate a special duty or obligation 
to assist underdeveloped countries and countries that for some reason are in need 
of financial assistance.   
 The provision of financial assistance is often considered to be one of the most 
powerful foreign policy instruments available to the EU (Smith, 2003 p.53).
10
 
This instrument however falls under the remit of the European Community and, as 
been stated above, role conceptions pertaining to the EU’s activities through the 
EC are discriminated by the delimitations of this study. Although discriminated 
the Developer role is included to the extent it is conceived by Javier Solana as a 
part of the EU role-set within the CFSP.  
 
“The EU as the first world donor. That capacity is an important feature in the 
European construction.” Solana, 7 July 2000 
 
                                                 
10
 Along with the capacity to enter into international agreements (Smith, 2003 p.53).  
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“Each month we commit nearly EUR 500 million for assistance to third world 
countries. (…) our obligation remains: to ensure that the money is being spent in 
the best possible way.” Solana, 18 April 2005 
 
Stabilizer. Compared to the Developer role the Stabilizer role refers to a deeper 
engagement not just limited to providing financial aid. It pertains to an active role 
in settling conflict, and is fundamentally based on conflict prevention, peace keep-
ing, crisis management and humanitarian as well as development aid. The Stabi-
lizer role could also be described as a more hands on version of the Defender 
/Promoter of Peace and Security role, using the entire toolbox of foreign policy 
instruments available to the EU, which means everything from sending special 
envoys and political dialogue to sending military personal with the mission to 
keep the peace. 
      
 “Maintaining law and order and fighting organised crime are integral parts of our 
crisis management and conflict prevention work throughout the Balkans. Only 
when we have managed to re-establish law and order in the region and tackle the 
organised crime that stretches across the Balkans into the European Union will 
our crisis management efforts have succeeded.” Solana, 10 May 2001 
 
“The European Union, for its part, is determined to make use of all its means to 
support the political process now under way. This involves technical and financial 
support for the Ituri Interim Administration and the Ituri Pacification Commission 
as well as for the process of disarming, demobilising and reintegrating the com-
batants in the district. It also undertakes to support the Ituri socio-economic reha-
bilitation programme and the local reconciliation process.” Solana, 18 July 2003 
 
Liberation Supporter. This is one of the seventeen role conceptions introduced by 
K.J. Holsti in his study from 1970. Holsti define it as a commitment to ‘support 
liberation movements without assuming any formal responsibilities’, and argues 
that usually statements suggest rather unstructured and vague attitudes about ac-
tions required to enact this role conception (Holsti, 1987 p.22). Of course one 
could discuss the definition of formal – what is formal responsibility in interna-
tional politics? – but in general Holsti’s definition applies to this study. Liberation 
Supporter refers to perceived commitments to support movements against oppres-
sion and dictatorship.   
 
“There can be no durable stability in the region as long as Milosevic remains in 
power. Our aim has to continue to be to support the forces of democracy, and to 
maintain pressure on the regime. We agreed recently to widen our dialogue by 
developing contacts with civil society (such as the church, NGOs, the media and 
academics). This is essential if we are to extend the support against Milosevic 
and to encourage the development of a true democratic process.” Solana, 30 
Mars 2000 
 
“(…) during the last year the Union has devoted considerable efforts to helping 
give a voice to those in Serbia who are genuinely committed to democracy.” So-
lana, 7 November 2000 
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Defender/Promoter of “EU” Values. The objective or commitment conceived of is 
quite simply to defend and promote a set of rights and values such as democracy 
and human rights. It also concerns the close relationship between democracy, hu-
man rights, and the market economy.    
 
 “We must uphold those values and principles on which the union itself is based.” 
Solana, 25 January 2000 
 
“(…) it is equally our duty to protect human rights. This is a very deep European 
conviction. It is a matter of preserving our basic values.” Solana, 24 January 2005 
 
Promoter of Multilateralism. Many assertions in this role conception are about hav-
ing the obligation to fulfil duties towards the United Nations and other interna-
tional organisation. It is also referring to a general commitment to encourage oth-
ers to cooperate within the framework of multilateral initiatives.  
 
“It is only through working closely together that we can effectively address the 
new challenges to our security and stability. We need a network of interlocking in-
ternational institutions and organisations if we are to have confidence in our abil-
ity to protect our own collective interest”. Solana, 18 January 2001 
 
“In a world of global challenges, our security and prosperity depends on an effec-
tive multilateral system. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its 
responsibilities and to act effectively must be a European priority.” 18 June 2003 
 
“I believe that our future security will depend more – not less – on an effective 
multilateral system, a rule-based international order and well-functioning interna-
tional institutions. Multilateralism is not an instrument of the weak. It is an instru-
ment of the wise.” Solana, 27 July 2004 
 
Partner. This role refers to the commitments Javier Solana articulated towards 
other international actors such as the United States and Mercosur. To talk about 
partnerships is quite popular in foreign policy rhetoric, and to put it in Holsti’s 
words; if one were to count up all the contemporary alliance commitments and 
other types of treaties, half the states in the system would have to be classified as 
faithful partners to the other half (Holsti, 1987 p.24 f.).  
 An effort has been made here to include only conceptions with a firm statement 
of commitment towards the other actor. Looking at the quote below only the first 
part, referring to the EU-US relationship, is considered to be a conception of the 
Partner role in this study.   
 
“The Transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. (…) we belong to the same fam-
ily; we share the same ideas and values. The US also needs Europe. The EU is 
the only global partner available to the US and vice-versa. (…) Being a global ac-
tor the EU also maintains close links with other parts of the world such as Africa, 
Latin America and Asia. Russia, Japan, China Canada and India (…) are all ma-
jor international actors and cooperation with them is essential for the EU.” So-
lana, 27 July 2004 
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4.2.1  The Structure of the Role-set    
 
The number one aim of this project has been to determine the EU foreign policy 
role. The previous section gave a short presentation of each of the ten roles that 
could be derived from speeches held by Javier Solana, and therefore here consid-
ered to be part of the EU set of foreign policy roles.  
 
 
Table 1. 
 
EU Roles, 2000-05 
 
(absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 
    
 
n = 80 Abs % 
 
Stabilizer 56 18 
 
Promoter of Multilateralism  44 14 
 
Partner 41 13 
 
Regional Leader 40 13 
 Defender/Promoter of Peace 
and Security 
40 13 
 Defender/Promoter of “EU” 
Values 
37 12 
 
Developer 25 8 
 
Model 13 4 
 
Global Leader 10 3 
 
Liberation Supporter 6 2 
    
Total 10 312 100 
 
 
Table 1 presents the role-set along with absolute and relative frequencies. Among 
the ten role conceptions, Stabilizer is mentioned most frequently and is the most 
widely distributed over the eighty speeches analysed here. This role, along with 
Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security, Regional Leader, Defender/Promoter 
of “EU” Values, Promoter of Multilateralism, and Partner are fairly equal regard-
ing the extent they are conceived of by Solana. The Developer role, which often is 
considered to be one of EU’s more profound international roles, is only mentioned 
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in twenty-five of the eighty speeches and scores rather low in relation to the other 
roles in the set. This is of course a more or less predicted outcome considering the 
expected effects of delimitations of the study which has been discussed above.         
 It was a surprise to see that Stabilizer scores so high, conceived of in fifty-six of 
the eighty speeches (70%). Considering the debate regarding EU actorness and 
EU capabilities one easily presumes that the more general, and to certain extent 
softer roles, such as Defender/Promoter of Peace and Security and De-
fender/Promoter of “EU” values, would totally dominate the role-set. To specu-
late about the reason for this would of course only be speculation, but even so, my 
explanation is as follows: 
 In the early stages of the research process, when conducting the initial pre-
study, there was a certain ambiguity concerning whether or not to include an addi-
tional “could be” role in the EU role-set – Promoter of EU influence. Charles 
Thumerelle argues that one of the roles conceived of by French foreign policy-
makers in the early 90s was to – Maintain or increase national power. This role 
refers to an ambition to ‘broaden France influence in the world and upgrade its 
rank, its prestige, and the respect it commands’ (Thumerelle et al, 1997 p.145). 
Fulfilling this role depends for instance on achieving greater competitiveness and 
influence through expanding the foreign policy toolbox, or convincing other ac-
tors about EU’s real potential.         
 
“The headline goal is ambitious. At Helsinki, Member States agreed that they 
must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year 
military forces of up to 60 000 persons capable of the full range of the so-called 
“Petersberg tasks”. (…) The military option will of course always be a measure of 
last resort. [But] We must have the capacity to intervene military in order to be 
credible (…).” Solana, 1 March 2000 
 
The decision taken here was to not include this additional “role” in the study. The 
decision was primarily based on the argument that Promoter of EU influence 
doesn’t refer to any foreign policy commitments, responsibilities or duties. It is 
rather an expression of an ambition for the EU to be able to take on additional 
tasks in the future, or to be more convincing in the performance of the roles al-
ready included in the role-set. However, even though it has been rejected from 
status as a foreign policy role of the EU, this so called “ambition” is still highly 
relevant here. 
 As been argued before in this thesis policy-makers use speeches as an instru-
ment to generate support, reveal intentions and to persuade other actors on the 
world scene. My point here is that the dominating position of the Stabilizer role in 
the role-set could be explained by the ambition to convince other actors about 
EU’s real potential. The EU is already a recognised Partner, Developer and gen-
eral Defender/ Promoter of Peace and Security, but the ability to take on missions 
pertaining to peace enforcement and crisis management has long been questioned. 
So quite simply by emphasising EU’s Stabilizer role in his speeches, Javier So-
lana seeks to persuade other actors about the merits of the Union.  
 In next section the topic for discussion will be how the distribution of roles has 
evolved since the beginning of the 21
st
 century. The purpose is to identify trends.  
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4.2.2  Distribution of Roles per Year    
 
In table 2 the gradual strengthening of the perception of EU’s international role as 
a Stabilizer becomes clear. From being mentioned in less than half of the speeches 
in year 2000, it is now emphasised on almost every occasion Solana makes an 
appearance to talk about the general outline of EU’s foreign and security policy.  
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Distribution of EU’s Roles per Year, 2000-05 
 
(absolute and relative [%] frequencies) 
       
n = 80 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of sources 20 12 11 14 16 7 
       
 Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % Abs % 
Stabilizer 8 9,0 9 20 9 17,6 12 25,0 12 22,2 6 24,0 
Promoter of  
Multilateralism  
6 6,7 8 17,8 9 17,6 8 16,7 10 18,5 3 12,0 
Partner 8 9,0 6 13,3 7 13,7 7 14,6 9 16,7 4 16,0 
Regional Leader 13 14,6 3 6,7 6 11,8 8 16,7 7 13,0 3 12,0 
Defender/Promoter of 
Peace and Security 
15 16,9 8 17,8 7 13,7 3 6,2 6 11,1 1 4,0 
Defender/Promoter of 
“EU” Values 
16 18,0 3 6,7 6 11,8 5 10,4 5 9,3 2 8,0 
Developer 10 11,2 4 8,9 6 11,8 2 4,2 2 3,7 1 4,0 
Model 7 7,9 3 6,7 1 2,0     2 8,0 
Global Leader   1 2,2   3 6,2 3 5,6 3 12,0 
Liberation Supporter 6 6,7           
       
Abs Total/% 89 100 45 100 51 100 48 100 54 100 25 100 
       
Number of roles 9 9 8 8 8 9 
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This development could of course be explained by the fact that since the begin-
ning of the year 2000 the EU has gradually increased and broadened it capabilities 
to enact its role as a Stabilizer. In this sample the Stabilizer role peaks in 2003 
which corresponds with the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), and the EU police mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.   
 Another noteworthy trend, or rather continuity, is the development of the Part-
ner role. The emphasis placed on the EU as a partner is rather constant (one can 
note a small increase). The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the EU role as 
a Partner is at any given time considered to be one of the more important func-
tions for the EU as an international actor. As to the role as Promoter of Multilat-
eralism and Regional Leader the situation is fairly similar. Even if they have ex-
perienced some fluctuations, they are still highly emphasised roles of the EU.  
 The Developer role goes from being a middle range role during the first three 
year period, to being emphasised only at a few occasions in the following three 
years. Again the most obvious explanation is that the aid instruments fall under 
the EC domain of the Union, but this time along with the gradual increase of ca-
pabilities to enact the other roles. During the first years EU action, almost exclu-
sively, was based on performance through the use of its economic instruments and 
economic influence. With the launch of the ESDP in 2003, a brand new set of 
instruments was added to the foreign policy tool box. This of course affects the 
way the Union perceives of itself as an actor. Solana no longer exclusively have to 
turn to the economic trades of the Union when talking about its foreign policy 
outline and international role.  
 An interesting fact is that the “softer” roles referred to earlier, Defender/Pro-
moter of Peace and Security and Defender/Promoter of “EU” values, that on be-
fore hand was predicted to dominate the role-set actually did so in 2000. The “de-
cline” could of course be explained by using the same arguments as before, new 
instruments imply changes in relative weight.  
 Global Leader and Liberation Supporter were added to the role-set during the 
main readings of the empirical material. These two are also emphasised the least 
when looking at the whole time period (table 1). Liberation Supporter disappears 
after 2000, actually with the fall of Milosevic and his regime. In fact all the con-
ceptions of the Liberation Supporter role were connected to the struggle against 
the regime in Belgrade. Perceptions related to Global Leader appear for the first 
time in 2001, but it is not until 2003 it makes a more solid appearance. It is tempt-
ing to once again explain this by referring to the launch of the ESDP, and I would 
like to argue that the ESDP, at least to a certain extent, is involved in the sudden 
appearance of the conception of the EU as a Global Leader.      
 
   
 
 
 
 
 33 
5.   Final Remarks 
 
 
 
 
 
The quantified material presented in table one and two, and derived form the 
analysis of the eighty speeches, can most certainly be analysed further. However, 
this thesis started of by a making a clear statement of purpose that deserves some 
final attention. Even if there already has been some speculation about the facts 
behind the figures, the main intention was to seek answers pertaining to two over-
arching questions:    
  
Which foreign policy roles does the EU ascribe to itself? 
 
How has the distribution of roles evolved since the beginning  
of the 21
st
 century? 
 
 These questions have already been answered in chapter four. The analysis pre-
sented an EU role-set consisting of ten roles in total. Out of these ten, five where 
accentuated in at least half of the analysed speeches. When looking at the different 
roles sorted by year one easily notices the strong evolution of EU’s perceived role 
as a Stabilizer. Other obvious trends are the downfall of the role as Developer and 
Liberation Supporter, and the high emphasis on promotion of multilateralism and 
partnership.        
 It has been widely argued here that the changes in role conceptions and the em-
phasis put on each role, could be explained by studying changes in capability. The 
fact that the ESDP goes operational in 2003 has been considered to be crucial. 
With the introduction of the ESDP, being a UK-French initiative from the bilat-
eral meeting at St Malo November 1998, the EU presented an ambition to widen 
its foreign policy toolbox with the ability to take on responsibilities such as hu-
manitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and crisis management (includ-
ing peace making). Yet, even though there was a general ambition it was not until 
1 January 2003, with the police mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU really 
proved its worth, and proved that it’s ready to take on more responsibility for 
global peace, stability and prosperity.    
   I am sure that the process of European integration will keep on producing ever 
more astonishing results, and that the EU gradually will strengthen its role as a 
Global Leader.  
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